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Questions of constitutional interpretation long have been the
focus of volumes of legal scholarship. In recent years, however, the
American public has increasingly confronted these questions as
well, first during the tumultuous events which surrounded the nomi-
nation of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court in 1987,'
and again as the Supreme Court handed down a triad of controver-
sial decisions concerning abortion,2 flag-desecration,3 and a per-
son's right to die.4 These difficult cases have reminded many that
constitutional law often has grave implications.
Presumably, the public outcry that swirled around Judge Bork's
failed nomination had something to do with his belief that the origi-
nal intention of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution should
be binding upon future interpreters of the document.5 Rightly or
1 See Saphire, Enough About Originalism, 15 N. Ky. L. REv. 513, 514 (1988) ("Perhaps
more than any single event in modem American history, the[] [Bork] hearings focused
public attention on the practical implications of a methodology of constitutional inter-
pretation .. ") The book in which Mr. Bork described his experiences as Supreme
Court nominee as well as his philosophy of constitutional interpretation, R. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990), remained on the New York Times best seller list for sev-
eral weeks.
2 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (statutory ban
on use of public employees and facilities for performance or assistance of nontherapeu-
tic abortions held not to be violative of the Constitution).
3 See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (burning American flag held to be
protected expression under the first amendment).
4 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (state
requirement that evidence of an incompetent person's wishes concerning withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment be proven by clear and convincing evidence held to be
constitutional).
5 See Perry, Why Constitutional Theory Matters To Constitutional Practice (And Vice Versa), 6
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wrongly, both the American people and the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee concluded that Judge Bork's theory of constitutional law
would lead to unacceptable results.6
Bork's constitutional jurisprudence-"originalism"-is not self-
evident. What is an originalist interpretation of the Constitution,
and what results does it compel in particular cases? This Comment
examines the originalist theory of constitutional interpretation by
applying it to a series of cases in which the Supreme Court estab-
lished and refined "the Massiah doctrine." Massiah holds that an in-
dividual formally accused of a crime may not to be questioned by
government agents in the absence of an attorney. The constitu-
tional provision which the doctrine is based upon, the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, is silent as to the scope of its protections and
the moment those protections attach. Critics of Massiah contend
that the doctrine has no foundation in either the text or the history
of the Constitution. In order to determine whether this contention
is true, the Massiah doctrine must be examined against the larger
backdrop of constitutional theory. Part II of this Comment dis-
cusses the cases which comprise Massiah. Part III examines the need
for constitutional theory and argues that, given this need, original-
ism is the least problematic theory of constitutional interpretation.
Part IV applies the originalist method to the sixth amendment cases
examined in Part II, an effort that ultimately reveals more about
originalism then it does about the correctness of the Court's deci-
sions. This Comment argues that originalism, in its most sophisti-
cated form, leaves room for precisely the kind of jurisprudential
disagreement which currently exists concerning the Massiah doc-
trine. Given the flexibility of the current originalist project, Massiah
cannot be criticized as being an implausible reading of the protec-
tion mandated by the right to counsel.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRETRIAL RIGHT To COUNSEL
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
CONST. COMM. 231, 241 (1989) (Bork was rejected as unfit for membership on the
Supreme Court "principally because of his originalist position on issues contested in
constitutional theory," and because of the "disturbing implications" that many felt his
jurisprudence had for judicial practice).
6 No matter how one feels about Judge Bork's theory of constitutional law, there is
little doubt that many of the charges leveled against him during his confirmation hear-
ings were distorted and unfair. See Kay, The Bork Nomination and the Definition of "The
Constitution, " 84 Nw. L. REV. 1190, 1191 (1990) ("No one can read the voluminous rec-
ord of the proceedings before the Senate Judiciary Committee without being impressed




vides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence."' 7 Like most constitutional provisions, the sixth amendment
provides little guidance for determining the outer boundaries of its
protections. Specifically, the sixth amendment remains silent as to
when the right to counsel attaches and the scope of protection af-
forded by the right when it has attached. In addition, the sixth
amendment says nothing about what the Constitution requires to
remedy its violation. These ambiguities have caused numerous
problems for the Supreme Court as it has struggled to fill in the
parameters of the constitutional right to counsel. This section ex-
amines one aspect of this struggle: the development of the Massiah
doctrine. Massiah holds that once formal adversary proceedings
have commenced against an individual, that person's sixth amend-
ment rights are violated if the government attempts to deliberately
elicit incriminating information from him or her.8 This doctrine has
proven to be both controversial and confusing for the police and
members of the Court, who have been unable to agree on whether
Massiah is grounded in the sixth amendment or is merely the prod-
uct of judicial usurpation of power.
The doctrinal history of the constitutional right to counsel
largely has been shaped by the vicissitudes of selective incorpora-
tion. For nearly eighty years after the Constitution was ratified, no
federal constitutional limitations on the states' administration of
criminal justice were recognized; the Bill of Rights only constrained
the actions of the federal government.9 The Reconstruction amend-
ments which followed the Civil War fundamentally altered the rela-
tionship between the federal government and the states, because,
for the first time, national constitutional protection was provided
fundamental individual rights against state aggression. 10 Despite
this intended realignment, the Supreme Court steadfastly adhered
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Israel, Criminal Procedure, The
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1319, 1326 (1977). The
decision by the framers not to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states reflected
both a concession to state power and a belief that preserving state autonomy was essen-
tial to the protection of individual rights. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 709 (1986). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 3-4 (1988).
10 See A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITTnON 111-14 (1987). See also, Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State Power, 1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
329, 348 (1983) (it is "quite arguabl[e]" that the ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment
intended to radically change the relationship between state and federal governments); L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, at 547.
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to a pre-Civil War notion of federalism and, in two important deci-
sions, drastically limited both the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment and Congress' power to implement it through legislation."
Thus, for the first sixty years of the fourteenth amendment's exist-
ence, all claims of infringement on individual rights by a state's
criminal procedures were rejected.' 2
Powell v. Alabama,13 the infamous "Scottsboro boys" case, al-
tered this pattern of complete deference to state authority. There,
for the first time, the Court read the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to include the right to counsel in a state criminal
proceeding.' 4 In Powell, eight black youths were charged with the
rape of two white women. Indicted and arraigned amidst a swirl of
racial animus, the defendants remained unrepresented by counsel
until the morning their trials began, at which time a local attorney
reluctantly agreed to represent them.' 5 Each of the trials were com-
pleted in one day, and all resulted in conviction. 16 Pursuant to Ala-
bama law, a jury had the discretion to fix the punishment for rape
from ten years imprisonment to death; 17 the juries in Powell imposed
the death penalty upon all eight defendants.' 8
11 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (effectively rendering the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment a dead letter only five
years after its ratification), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down
the public accomodation sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
12 See Allen, The Judicial Quest For Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Ciminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 518, 522 (1975). Three important cases that came before the
Court during this time period were Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); and, Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Each of
these cases involved claims that state criminal proceedings were violative of the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause; in each, the state action was upheld. See Allen,
supra, at 522.
'3 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 See id at 68-71. Powell has been described as initiating the end of "the 'stone age'
of American criminal procedure." See Kamisar, Kauper's 'Judicial Examination of the Ac-
cused" Forty Years Later- Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH L. REv. 15, 16
(1974); see also, Allen, supra note 12, at 521 (Powell ushered in "the modem law of consti-
tutional criminal procedure"). The case has also been described as raising "[o]ne of the
intriguing questions of constitutional history": "[W]hy the Court... first undertook to
impose limitations on state power in the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 522.
Professor Allen sees the Court's decision in Powell as, at least in part, a reaction to the
rising tide of fascism in pre-World War II Europe: "The European dictatorships, once
installed, taught graphic lessons in the uses of the institutions of criminal justice as in-
strumentalities for the systematic destruction of political values upon which free socie-
ties rest." Id. These "graphic lessons" led the Court to begin to view the administration
of criminal justice less as a local matter and more as an essential component of a na-
tional strategy of freedom. Id.
15 Powell, 287 U.S. at 52-56.





The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, reversed the defendants'
rape convictions, stressing the "casual fashion" in which the matter
of counsel had been disposed of in a capital case.' 9 In the majority
opinion, Justice Sutherland emphasized that effective assistance of
counsel was a crucial ingredient to any defendant's fair trial.20 Fur-
thermore, a court's duty to assign counsel for a defendant was not
discharged by an assignment so late in the proceedings as to pre-
clude the effective aid of counsel in the prepararation and trial of
the case.21 The Court noted:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against
these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment
until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing
investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants
did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
2 2
Although the holding in Powell was narrow and carefully limited to
the facts,23 the Court for the first time recognized the existence of a
constitutional right to pretrial assistance of counsel.
Although Powell may have taken a small chunk from the armor
of dual sovereignty, the Court continued to view the obligations of
federalism as a major constraint on its role in the criminal cases
which arose in the next three decades. 24 In Betts v. Brady,25 the
Court reiterated that due process mandated the appointment of'
counsel for indigents in noncapital cases only under special circum-
stances. 26 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the Court
19 Id. at 56.
20 See id. at 69. Justice Sutherland stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel .... Left without the aid of counsel [the
defendant] may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incom-
petent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. [The
defendant] lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, [the
defendant] faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to estab-
lish his innocence. Id. at 68-69.
21 Id. at 71.
22 Id. at 57.
23 See id. at 71:
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion-the ignorance and
illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the
imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants of the military forces, the
fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with
them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their
lives-we think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and oppor-
tunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.
24 See Allen, supra note 12, at 526.
25 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26 See id. at 471-473. See also, id. at 473:
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increasingly began to treat state criminal proceedings with'less def-
erence. Thus, in Hamilton v. Alabama,27 the Court ruled that arraign-
ment was a critical stage of Alabama state procedure and, therefore,
denial of counsel at that stage of a capital case violated the defend-
ant's due process guarantees. 2
8
The case which most directly effected development of the pre-
trial right to counsel was Spano v. New York, 29 which came to the
Court in 1959. In Spano, the defendant was indicted for murder,
retained counsel, and then surrendered to police.30 After his sur-
render, the defendant was interrogated by the police for nearly
eight hours, during which time he repeatedly requested, and was
denied, an opportunity to meet with his lawyer.31 He eventually
succumbed to the persistence of the officers and confessed to the
murder.3 2 The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and
Spano was convicted and sentenced to death.
33
The Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction, holding
the appellant's confession inadmissable because it was the result of
overly zealous police conduct inconsistent with the standards of due
process. The Court found that the dubious manner in which
Spano's confession had been secured led to his will being "over-
borne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely
[W]hile want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in
such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment em-
bodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel.
Betts exemplifies the Court's due process jurisprudence as it existed from Powell in 1932
until the early sixties. During this time, the Court applied the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment only to rights regarded as "fundamental" to the achievement of
justice. See Israel, supra note 9, at 1327 (1977); see also, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). Therefore, constitutional guarantees "did not necessarily have the same
content in their application to state proceedings under the fourteenth amendment as
they had in their application to federal criminal proceedings under the Bill of Rights."
Israel, supra note 9, at 1326-27.
27 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
28 Id. In Hamilton, the Court viewed the arraignment as a critical stage because state
law mandated that defenses not raised at that point be considered abandoned. See W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 484 (1985). See also, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE,
&J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 76 (1986).
29 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
30 Id. at 316-17.
31 Id. at 317-19.
32 During the interrogation, a superior police officer instructed a boyhood friend of
the defendant, then "a fledgling police officer," to pretend that a phone call from the
defendant had gotten him into much trouble and that his job as a policeman was in
danger, thereby seeking "to extract sympathy" from the defendant, because his friend
had a "pregnant wife and three children." Id. at 319. The young officer's job was, in
actuality, "in no way threatened." Id.




In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Douglas and Brennan, argued that the conviction be overturned
purely on due process right to counsel grounds:
[I]t is my view that the absence of counsel when this confession was
elicited was alone enough to render it inadmissible under the Four-
teenth Amendment....
Our Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man on
trial for his life in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge,
open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of
the law. Surely a Constitution which promises that much can vouch-
safe no less to the same man under midnight inquisition in the squad
room of a police station.35
According to Stewart, it was not the disingenuous manner in which
Spano's confession was extracted that made it invalid, but rather
that the post-indictment interrogation occurred in the absence of
counsel.
3 6
In 1963, the Supreme Court made the sixth amendment right
to counsel applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. 37 The importance of this step should not be underestimated;
an incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights was subsequently
viewed by the Court as applying to the states in exactly the same
manner in which it applied to the federal government.38 This in
turn contributed to the significance of a case decided one year later,
Massiah v. United States,39 where the Supreme Court adopted the
constitutional interpretation of the right to counsel offered by Jus-
tice Stewart in Spano. After being indicted for a narcotics violation,
34 Id. at 323.
35 Id. at 326-327 (Stewart, Douglas, & Brennan, JJ, concurring). In a separate con-
currence, Justice Douglas also relied exclusively on the right to counsel:
Depriving a person, formally charged with a crime, of counsel during the period
prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial
itself ....
... [W]hat use is a defendant's right to effective counsel at every stage of a criminal
case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of coun-
sel until he confesses? In that event the secret trial in the police precincts effectively
supplants the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 325-326 (Douglas, Black, & Brennan, JJ, concurring).
36 Id. at 327 ("Under our system ofjustice an indictment is supposed to be followed
by an arraignment and a trial.").
37 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants
have a sixth amendment right to representation by counsel in all felony trials).
38 See Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy,
80 N.W. L. REV. 100, 118 n. 99 (1985) ("Because an incorporated provision thus [came]
to the states with both its incidental and 'fundamental' interpretations, due process
through the vehicle of incorporation (could] impose on the states what due process by
itself [could not].").
39 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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Massiah retained counsel, pled not guilty, and met bail.40 After be-
ing released, Massiah's codefendant invited him to discuss the case
pending against them. During the ensuing conversation, Massiah,
unaware that the codefendant had agreed to cooperate with federal
agents, made several incriminating statements. 4' A government
agent overheard and recorded the statements through a radio trans-
mitter.42 At Massiah's trial the statements were entered into evi-
dence, and the jury returned a conviction.43
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Speak-
ing for the Court, Justice Stewart held that Massiah's sixth amend-
ment rights were violated when at trial his own incriminating words
were admitted as evidence, because those statements had been "de-
liberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel. ' ' 44 Although the Court acknowledged the
factual distinction between Spano, where the defendant was interro-
gated in a police station, and Massiah, where the damaging testi-
mony was elicited from the unaware defendant while he was free on
bail,45 it nevertheless held that, to be effective, the constitutional
right to counsel "must apply to indirect and surreptitious interroga-
tions as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.
' 46
Massiah proved to be a sixth amendment watershed-the Court
there read the right to counsel to apply to a situation previously not
constitutionally protected.47 In so doing, the constitutional role of
counsel was extended from the traditional function of trial prepara-
tion and participation to include the counseling and representation
of persons formally accused of a crime.48 The magnitude of this
extension was not lost on the dissenters. Justice White contended
that the majority's opinion was based on unsound logic: merely be-
cause an accused had a right to counsel before and during the trial,
40 Id. at 201.
41 Id. at 202-03.
42 Id. at 203.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 206.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Cur-
rent Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1157 (1987). Professor Uviller
contends that Massiah for the first time took the sixth amendment right to counsel out of
the courtroom, "the forum in which lawyers have special training and competence," and
expanded the postaccusation critical stages doctrine "into new precincts whose dimen-
sions are ill-defined and not readily ascertainable." Id. at 1159. But cf. Milton v. Wain-
wright, 407 U.S. 371, 382 (1972) (Stewart, J., with Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, 1J.,
dissenting) ("The rule in [Massiah] has been settled law ever since Powell v. Alabama.").
48 See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation "? When
Does it Matter, 67 GEO. LJ. 1, 24 (1978).
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it did not necessarily follow that his or her out-of-court admissions
must be also excluded if obtained in the absence of counsel.49
White argued that "[t]he right to counsel has never meant as much
before.., and its extension in this case requires some further expla-
nation, so far unarticulated by the Court."' 50
Massiah's significance largely is due to this apparent shift in the
Supreme Court's fundamental understanding of what the sixth
amendment right to counsel entails. The case established an impor-
tant new function of the right to counsel: it could now be used, once
formal proceedings had been initiated, as an effective bar to state
efforts to obtain evidence. 5'
Massiah was also a crucial right to counsel case for another im-
portant reason. The Massiah Court held that the violation of the
right to counsel was not complete until the evidence obtained from
the defendant was admitted at trial.52 The failure to exclude evi-
dence obtained in a manner inconsistent with Massiah was not "col-
lateral" to a separate constitutional violation. Because the sixth
amendment specifically addresses procedural aspects of prosecution
and trial, it was the admission at trial of evidence acquired in viola-
tion of the right to counsel which infringed the constitutional
right. 53 This placed the Massiah exclusionary rule on "very different
footing" 54 than the exclusionary rules established in Mapp v. Ohio55
49 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207-13 (White, J., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
50 id. at 209.
51 See Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underly-
ing the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1979).
52 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 ("All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminat-
ing statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed,
could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his
trial."). The dissent in Massiah also described the Court's holding as creating "a consti-
tutional rule... barring the use of evidence." Id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
53 See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 865, 889 (1981).
54 Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?,
22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 85, 175 (1984).
55 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp, the precursor to Gideon, held that evidence taken by
state officials in violation of the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures was inadmissible in state court proceedings, id. at 655, thereby
overruling the twelve-year-old case, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The exclu-
sionary rule which attaches to a Mapp violation is not, however, compelled by the
Constitution:
The current conception of Mapp is that a fourth amendment violation is complete
when the police withdraw from the area they have searched. The evidentiary fruits
of that illegal search may, later, be excluded from court, but the point is not that
their admission would violate any personal right of the person aggrieved.... It is,
rather, that excluding this evidence today will tend to discourage the police from
violating somebody else's fourth amendment rights tomorrow.
Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 54, at 175.
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and Miranda v. Arizona,56 the landmark Supreme Court decisions or-
dering the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth and fifth amendments.
Although controversial when decided, Massiah largely laid dor-
mant for over a decade; overshadowed by Miranda, Massiah's poten-
tial was "lost in the shuffle."' 57 The case's likely divisive effect,
however, was evidenced by its first major application in one of the
most well-known cases in constitutional criminal procedure, Brewer
v. Williams. 58 There, the defendant was arraigned on an arrest war-
rant in connection with the Christmas Eve disappearance of a young
girl in Des Moines, Iowa.5 9 The defendant had consulted with attor-
neys in both Davenport (where he had surrendered to police) and
Des Moines, who advised him not to make any statements concern-
ing the charges. 60 When one of the attorneys learned that a detec-
tive would be transporting Williams back to Des Moines, he insisted
upon, and received, an assurance from the police that no interroga-
tion would take place.6 1 On the subsequent trip, one of the accom-
panying police officers delivered a speech in which he mentioned to
the defendant that the victim's parents were "entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christ-
mas [E]ve and murdered." 62 In response, Williams, whom the of-
ficer knew to be a deeply religious man, made several incriminating
statements and led the police to the girl's body.
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled the defendant's state-
ments inadmissible. Again, Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for
the 5-4 majority, stating that Williams' right to counsel under the
56 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The legendary Miranda held the self-incrimination privilege
of the fifth amendment to apply to police questioning at the station house and that, in
order to protect that privilege, police must inform suspects by reciting to them the warn-
ings which came to bear the case's name. See White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor
Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. 2 (1986), reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 28, at 568. As is the case with Mapp, evidence
acquired in violation of Miranda can be used as evidence against a defendant without
violating the Constitution. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (holding
that the procedural safeguards established in Miranda "were not themselves rights pro-
tected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected."). See also Grano supra note 38, at 106-11.
57 Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 884, quoting Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 160 (1980). See also Bradley, Criminal Procedure
in the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273, 277 (1987) (Brewer
"resurrected" Massiah).
58 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
59 Id. at 390-91.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 391.
62 Id. at 393.
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sixth and fourteenth amendments was activated because judicial
proceedings had begun before the fateful journey to Des Moines. 63
Because Williams had not validly waived his right to counsel, the
Court affirmed the reversal of his conviction.
64
Chief Justice Burger, writing in dissent, exerted little effort in
masking his displeasure with the holding in Brewer: "The result in
this case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to call
itself an organized society." 65 Burger insisted that the the sixth
amendment was meant to serve as a constitutional guarantor of an
incorrupt factfinding process and a fair trial.66 Because the facts
surrounding Williams' statements implicated "no issue either of
fairness or evidentiary reliability," Burger concluded that the sup-
pression of those statements was unjustified.6 7
In Brewer, the majority went to considerable effort to establish
that the Christian burial speech was "tantamount to interroga-
tion."' 68 There was disagreement among the Justices over this con-
clusion, but even the dissenters agreed that it was important to
determine whether the officers' conduct had risen to the level of in-
terrogative behavior.69 The Court, however, appears to have been
engaged in superfluous behavior-nothing, in fact, turned on
whether Williams had been interrogated. This inquiry was simply
irrelevant because, as Professor Kamisar has noted, Massiah actually
stood for the proposition that, once formal adversarial proceedings
had been commenced against an individual, that person had the
right to legal representation "whether or not the government 'interro-
gates' him." 70 The Court in Massiah read the sixth amendment to
draw a line at which any further police questioning of the accused in
63 Id. at 399:
There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial proceedings had been initi-
ated against Williams .... A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been
arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom, and he had
been committed by the court to confinement in jail.
64 Id. at 404-406.
65 Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 426.
67 Id. In a separate dissent, Justice White also emphasized the absence of conditions
which he felt the right to counsel was designed to protect against. Because "the officers'
conduct did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of [Williams'] trial or in
any way risk the conviction of an innocent man" White saw no reason to suppress the
incriminating statements which were the fruits of that conduct. Id. at 437 (White,J., with
Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
68 Id. at 400.
69 Id. at 440 (Blackmun,J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("I would say it is
clear there was no interrogation."); see also id. at 434 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Christian burial speech was not interrogation because "it was accompanied by a
request that [Williams] not respond to it.").
70 Kamisar, supra note 48 at 33.
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the absence of counsel is not tolerated. This is the case whether or
not that questioning is "interrogation," or something less. There-
fore, although the result in Brewer was consistent with the dictates of
Massiah, much of its reasoning was not. The doctrine had exper-
ienced a rather inauspicious debut; in its first major application of
Massiah, the Court largely got it wrong.71
The next important application of Massiah occurred in 1980. In
United States v. Henry, 72 an incarcerated defendant made incriminat-
ing postindictment statements to a cellmate who was acting as a gov-
ernment informant. 73 The statements subsequently were used as
evidence at trial. 74 Although the informant had been instructed not
to initiate conversation with the defendant, he also was told that he
would be remunerated for any incriminating information which he
was able to relay to the prosecution. 75 The Court, surprisingly
speaking through Chief Justice Burger,76 held that the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated because the
government had "intentionally [created] a situation likely to induce
[the defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assist-
ance of counsel." 77 Henry thus extended Massiah by applying the
doctrine, not only to situations in which the government deliber-
ately elicited statements from an accused person, but also to those
where the police intentionally created a scenario likely to induce in-
criminating statements by a criminal suspect in the absence of
counsel.
78
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, wrote a formidable
dissent in Henry,79 contending that the decision "cut[] [itself] loose
from the moorings" of Massiah.80 While not arguing against Massiah
itself, Blackmun rejected the belief that the doctrine could be legiti-
mately extended any further: "Massiah certainly is the decision in
71 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401 ("[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representa-
tion when the government interrogates him.") (emphasis added). Clearly, this is not the rule
enunciated in Massiah.
72 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
73 Id. at 266.
74 Id. at 266-67.
75 Id.
76 See Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1979-1980 at 99.
77 Henry, 447 U.S at 274.
78 See Saltzburg, Foreward: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the
Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. LJ. 151, 206 (1980).
79 See Kamisar, supra note 76, at 101.
80 Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Blackmun and White, JJ., dissenting). See also id. at 280
("[T]he Court's 'likely to induce' test fundamentally restructures Massiah.").
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which Sixth Amendment protections have been extended to their
outermost point." 8' Blackmun argued that there was a fundamental
difference between the facts of Massiah and those of Henry. In Mas-
siah, a government agent had organized the pretrial rendezous be-
tween the accused and the turncoat co-defendant;8 2 in Henry,
however, the agent instructed the informant "not to elicit statements
from [the defendant], but merely passively to receive them."
8 3
Thus, because the record in Henry failed to show any indication that
the informant had "stimulated" the incriminating remarks, Black-
mun contended that Henry failed to satisfy the "deliberately elicit"
requirement of Massiah.8 4
In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist seized the chance to
question the constitutional legitimacy of the Massiah doctrine.8 5
Rehnquist urged that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
based upon a traditional understanding of the role of the attorney as
"legal expert and strategist."8 6 Therefore, whether or not deliber-
ate elicitation had occurred after formal proceedings had been initi-
ated was not determinative of whether the right to counsel had been
violated.87 Justice Rehnquist argued that Massiah "rest[ed] on a
prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment" which was not
constitutionally mandated:88
If the event is not one that requires knowledge of legal procedure,
involves a communication between the accused and his attorney con-
cerning investigation of the case or the preparation of a defense, or
otherwise interferes with the attorney-client relationship, there is in
81 Id. at 282.
82 Id. at 279.
83 Id. at 278.
84 Id. at 287-88. See also id., at 279 (claiming that the Court's ruling in Henry "saps the
word 'deliberately' of all significance.").
85 Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 293. Rehnquist beckoned back to the Court's opinion in Powell for support
of his reading of the traditional nature of the right to counsel protection:
Historically and in practice, in our country at least, [a hearing] has always included
the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the
right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment
is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incom-
petent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 291-92 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
87 Id. at 293.
88 Id. at 289.
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my view simply no constitutional prohibition against the use of incrim-
inating information voluntarily obtained from an accused despite the
fact that his counsel may not be present.8 9
Although Rehnquist obviously felt that the Court had wrongly
interpreted the constitutional mandates of the sixth amendment, he
was wrong to characterize the Massiah rule as "prophylactic" in na-
ture.90 The Court had been quite explicit in Massiah,9 ' Brewer,9 2 and
Henry93 that the rule it established and refined in those cases was not
merely a judicial creation designed to deter government miscon-
duct, but rather, was required by the sixth amendment itself. The
exclusionary rule attached to the sixth amendment through Massiah,
unlike those that attach to the fourth and fifth amendments, was a
matter of constitutional right.
94
The last piece of the Massiah doctrinal puzzle was put into place
by the Court in Maine v. Moulton,95 a case which presented a factual
pattern quite analogous to that of Massiah. In Moulton, the defend-
ant was indicted for theft, retained counsel, and, upon release on
bail, made incriminating remarks to his codefendant, who was coop-
erating with the prosecution.96 The Moulton scenario, however, was
unique in two ways: the defendant himself had arranged for the
meeting where the self-incrimination took place,97 and the govern-
ment was using the Moulton informant to investigate a crime other
than the one for which the defendant had been indicted. 98
The Court, unpersuaded that these were important factual dis-
tinctions, held that the case fell under the rubric of Massiah. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, stated that the identity
of the party who engineered the meeting where the incrimination
took place was irrelevant to the Court's holdings in Massiah and
Hen7y. 99 Brennan held that the right to counsel, at least after formal
89 Id. at 293-94.
90 See Grano, supra note 38, at 123.
91 See 377 U.S. 201, 205 ("Here we deal ... with a federal case where the specific
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment directly applies.... We hold that the petitioner was
denied the basic protections of that guarantee ... ").
92 See 430 U.S. 387, 398 ("IT]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been intiated against him .... ).
93 See 447 U.S. at 274 ("By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to
make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government vio-
lated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
94 See supra, notes 51-56, and accompanying text.
95 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
96 Id. at 162-66.
97 Id. at 174.
98 Id. at 178.
99 See id. at 174-75 ("[T]he identity of the party who instigated the meeting at which
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charges have been brought, required that an accused's attorney
serve as a "medium" between her and the government.'0 0 One as-
pect of such.a requirement is an affirmative obligation on the part of
the government not to act in a manner that might circumvent the
protections accorded one who has invoked their right to counsel. 10 1
Although this constitutional requirement is not violated if incrimi-
nating information is obtained from the accused through mere "luck
or happenstance" (even when the right to counsel has already at-
tached), Brennan strongly emphasized that this was not the case in
Moulton, where the state had knowingly exploited the opportunity to
confront the defendant in the absence of his counsel. 10 2 Capitaliz-
ing on the opportunity to circumvent an accused's right to counsel,
Brennan argued, was the equivalent of intentionally creating that
opportunity and, therefore, breached the government's sixth
amendment obligation. 10 3
The dissenters in Moulton, speaking through Chief Justice Bur-
ger, reiterated Justice Blackmun's argument that Massiah marked the
outermost boundaries of the constitutional right to counsel and
should be extended no further. 10 4 In addition, even if the protec-
tions of the sixth amendment had extended to the facts in Moulton,
Burger argued that applying the exclusionary rule to suppress the
garnered evidence was unnecessary. 10 5 Because the purpose of the
exclusionary rule was to deter police misbehavior, it did not need to
extend to cases such as Moulton, where "it is impossible to identify
any police 'misconduct' to deter .... -"106 Absent any need for deter-
ence, Burger concluded that the costs outweighed the benefits of
suppressing inherently trustworthy evidence. 107
This analysis again evidences the confusion which surrounds
Massiah, particularly with regard to its exclusionary rule. A cost-
benefit approach to the suppression of evidence is appropriate when
the exclusionary rule being applied is a "prophylactic" rule
designed to serve as a protective safeguard against the violation of a
constitutional right. s08 Because such a rule is not constitutionally
the Government obtained incriminating statements was not decisive or even important
to our decisions in Massiah or Henry .....




104 Id. at 190 (Burger, CJ., joined by White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 192.
107 Id. at 191 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
108 See Grano, supra note 38, at 105.
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mandated, if the costs of suppressing evidence under it outweigh
the benefits of doing so, that evidence may be admitted into trial
without violating the Constitution.' 09 However, as noted above, a
violation of Massiah is not complete until the evidence gathered is
used against the defendant at trial. 10 Therefore, it is the sixth
amendment itself that requires that the evidence be suppressed."'
Because the Massiah exclusionary rule is compelled by the sixth
amendment, it must be applied regardless of the costs of doing so.
After Moulton, the Massiah doctrine was largely in place.1 2 The
doctrine holds that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches
once formal adversary proceedings are commenced against an indi-
vidual. After that point, the police must respect the right to counsel
by refraining from deliberately eliciting information from the ac-
cused, absent the presence of his or her attorney. If statements are
obtained in the absence of counsel, the sixth amendment requires
that they not be used against the defendant'at trial.
Massiah and its progeny have come to represent a particularly
confused constitutional doctrine. Some members of the Supreme
Court see the doctrine as a valid application of the sixth amendment
right to counsel, others see the Massiah decision itself as correct but
criticize further extensions of its reasoning, while still others criti-
cize the Court's work in Massiah as going far beyond what the sixth
amendment requires. In addition, the Court's inconsistent applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence gathered by the
government in violation of Massiah has further contributed to the
confusion. In order to determine whether the Massiah doctrine is or
is not compelled by the sixth amendment right to counsel, it must
be examined against the larger backdrop of constitutional theory.
According to what guidelines should the language of the sixth
amendment be construed?
109 Id.
110 See supra note 52, and accompanying text.
111 See Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 889:
[T]he Massiah "exclusionary rule" is not merely a prophylactic device; it is not
designed to reduce the risk of actual constitutional violations and is not intended to
deter any pretrial behavior whatsoever. Rather, Massiah explicitly permits govern-
ment efforts to obtain information from an indicted suspect, so long as that infor-
mation is not used "as evidence against him at his trial." The failure to exclude
evidence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to some more fundamental vio-
lation. Instead it is the admission at trial that in itself denies the constitutional
right.
112 Recent Massiah cases have mainly addressed the issue of waiver. See e.g., Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (Miranda warnings administered by law enforcement offi-
cials were sufficient to support a waiver of right to counsel for post-indictment confes-
sion); Michigan v. Harvey 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990) (statement taken subsequent to
defendant's invocation of right to counsel may be used for purposes of impeachment).
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Although the debate over contrasting theories of constitutional
interpretation have generated tens of thousands of pages of legal
scholarship in the last two decades, very little of this work has fo-
cused on the constitutional provisions that concern the administra-
tion of criminal justice: "Even those who are intimately acquainted
with the criminal procedure aspects of constitutional law tend to
give relatively little attention to criminal procedure when they con-
centrate on constitutional theory.""13 With this omission in mind,
the remainder of this Comment examines the dominant theory of
constitutional interpretation (at least in terms of the attention it has
generated from both proponents and critics), originalism, and then
applies the theory to the controversies surrounding Massiah in an
effort to determine whether the originalist method offers any in-
sights into the proper scope of the sixth amendment right to
counsel.
III. THE INTERPRETIVE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM
A. WHY THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY?
Although several aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in
Marbury v. Madison 114 are prone to criticism," x5 there is no doubt
that once the jurisprudential dust had settled, the Court possessed
the authority to render invalid actions by legislative and executive
officials which it deemed to be inconsistent with the United States
Constitution."' 6 How the Court should conduct itself in carrying
out this endeavor has been the source of conjecture since that time.
Issues of constitutional interpretation and proper judicial role are
inextricably linked in this determination. The interpretive method-
ology of constitutional adjudication that one finds to be most cor-
rect will, in large part, be a reflection of how much or how little
discretion that person feels the judicial branch should be accorded
when applying the fundamental law in a constitutional
democracy. "17
113 Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 399, 400 n.4 (1985). But cf., Wasserstrom
and Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. LJ. 19 (1988).
114 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
115 See Amar, Marbuy, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 443 (1989) (arguing that the Marbury Court erred in interpreting section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as conferring on the Court original jurisdiction); A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14 (1962) (the Court's opinion in Marbury is "very
vulnerable."). The most-cited examination of the shortcomings of the Marbury decision
is Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ. 1 (1969).
116 "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what
the law is." 5 U.S. at 176.
117 See Chemerensky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
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In the Marbury opinion, ChiefJustice John Marshall represented
the processes of judicial review to be largely mechanical in na-
ture.' 18 Constitutional adjudication, however, quickly proved to be
a much more discretionary and indeterminate endeavor. 119 The
constitutional provisions implicated by cases reaching the Supreme
Court are invariably expressed in "delphic or ambiguous" lan-
guage.120 These open-textured provisions permit a range of plausi-
ble linguistic meanings. 121 Judges in turn must ask "where should
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1207, 1210 (1984) ("The real question for
debate is how much discretion the Court should have in interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution.").
118 In Marbury, Marshall offered three examples of legislation that would be violative
of the Constitution: Congressional enactment of a bill of attainder or taxation on a
state's export of cotton, tobacco, or flour, both clear violations of article I, section 9, and
legislation allowing that a conviction for treason be based on one witness's testimony or
an out-of-court confession, an act that would be inequivocably inconsistent with the tex-
tual mandate of article III, section 3. Marshall shrewdly chose three of the least ambigu-
ous constitutional provisions for his examples. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN,
& M. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 31 (describing this sort of analysis as "mechanical"); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 186 n.1 1 (1980) (Marshall's reasoning in Marbuy "de-
pends heavily on the assumption that constitutional review involves merely the tradi-
tional judicial function of comparing one legally prescribed mandate with another to see
if they conflict .. ") The quintessential statement representing judicial review to be
simply mechanical in nature is Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (judicial review requires the Court "to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the former.").
119 See Saphire, The Search For Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity, 42
OHIo STATE Li. 335, 338 (1981) ("[A] court, in exercising the power of review in consti-
tutional cases, must do what it is supposed to do-interpret. But it must really interpret,
and that function can be somewhat more complex and sophisticated than ChiefJustice
Marshall first led us to believe."). One indication that this is so is that, in the other two
cases that, along with Marbury, comprise the trilogy of constitutional adjudication which
made Marshall legendary, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Marshall applies constitutional reason-
ing bearing little resemblance to that which he described in Marbuy. In McCulloch and
Gibbons, Justice Marshall gave broad readings to the commerce clause (article I, section
8, clause 3), and the necessary and proper clause (article I, section 8, clause 18), respec-
tively; neither result, however, was compelled by the text of the Constitution in the same
sense as those reached in Marshall's hypotheticals.
120 Saphire, supra note 119, at 338. See also, J. ELY, supra note 118, at 13 ("Constitu-
tional provisions exist on a spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the ex-
tremely open-textured."). The constitutional provisions at issue in cases that animate
the Supreme Court are rarely phrased in language so clear as to render one outcome
inarguably correct: "Decisions either way in Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537 (1896)], Loch-
ner v. New York [198 U.S. 45 (1905)], Brown v. Board of Education [347 U.S. 483 (1954)],
and Roe v. Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)] would have fallen within the boundaries marked
by the constraints in question." Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory
of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 566 (1985).
121 See Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 613 (1985). Sanford Levinson offers
perhaps the most radical version of this statement: "There are as many plausible read-
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we go in search of guiding principles for interpreting the linguisti-
cally open-ended clauses of the Constitution .,. . ?"122 This search
constitutes the enterprise of constitutional interpretive theory, 12
3
and is necessary because of the unique role that ajudiciary plays in a
constitutional democracy:
Some theory of our Constitution-more particularly, when we talk of
judicial review, some theory of the appropriate constitutional role of
an appointed judiciary in a government like ours-must be developed
and defended unless we are content simply with a Court that grinds
whatever political ax it prefers on a particular day.
124
Such a Court would not do because of America's commitment,
to popular sovereignty: "[R]ule in accord with the consent of a ma-
jority of those governed is the core of the American governmental
system."1 25 The doubts that are most often expressed about the in-
stitution of judicial review rest upon a concern that, in interpreting
the Constitution, judges will be influenced by their own views about
how society should be ordered.' 26 The most famous characteriza-
tion of the tension that exists between judicial review and democ-
racy when an unelected judiciary invalidates the work of an
electorally accountable legislature is Alexander Bickel's
countermajoritarian difficulty. 127 Absent a theory of constitutional
interpretation, judicial review could easily erode into government
by judicial fiat, a notion antithetical to the concept of majority
rule. '2 8
It seems, however, that the countermajoritarian specter ofjudi-
ings of the United States Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet, even though each
interpreter, like each director, might genuinely believe that he or she has stumbled onto
the one best answer to the conundrums of the text." Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tax.
L. REV. 373, 391 (1982).
122 Schauer, supra note 113, at 399.
123 See Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 281 (1985):
Legal reasoning-reasoning done by judges in deciding particular cases-is
special in ways demanding that any complete theory of adjudication include some
subtheory called a theory of interpretation. Legal reasoning has a text to deal with
in the same way that theology, dream theory, or literary criticism deal with various
texts. All such "hermeneutic" enterprises are distinct from the normal scientific
enterprise of explaining phenomenon, natural or social, in that they depend upon
the existence of a text that requires interpretation.
124 Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1978).
125 j. ELY, supra note 118, at 7.
126 See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 33.
127 See A. BICKEL, supra note 115, at 16-17 ("[W]hen the Supreme Court declares un-
constitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.").
128 See Chemerensky, Foreward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 44, 46
(1989) ("For several decades, the scholarly literature.., has been dominated by... a
conviction that judicial review is a deviant institution in a democratic society.").
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cial review has been exaggerated. The Constitution does not estab-
lish untrammeled majority rule; many aspects of the document itself
are countermajoritarian.1 29 Therefore, although judicial review is
undoubtedly countermajoritarian in nature, this fact does not mean
that the institution is inconsistent with the political values expressed
in the Constitution.1 30 This recognition that the Constitution con-
tains both democratic and countermajoritarian aspects, however,
does not in any way lessen the need for constitutional theory.
Although the document does not provide for unconstrained major-
ity rule, neither does it allow for arbitrary, unlimited judicial discre-




The necessity of constrained constitutional judgment, born
fromjudicial review's potentially devastating effect on constitutional
democracy, continues to motivate scholarly attempts to define the
parameters of the Court's role in constitutional enforcement. 132
Originalism has been the major theory offered as a safeguard against
judicial subjectivity. 133 Originalists posit that judges should apply
constitutional rules "in the sense in which those rules were understood by the
people who enacted them." 134 Originalism purports to be the theory
that best reconciles the tensions between democracy and judicial re-
view. The Constitution is authoritative fundamental law because it
was ratified by the people; 13 5 therefore, it only makes sense to inter-
pret constitutional language as it was understood by those who had
the authority to make it law-its enactors. Problems arise, of
course, because those who framed the Constitution and its amend-
ments often chose nebulous, open-ended phraseology.' 3 6 But
129 See id., at 74-77. See also Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, reprinted in INTERPRETING LAW AND LrrERATURE 13 (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux
eds.) (1988) ("It is the very purpose of a Constitution-and particularly of the Bill of
Rights-to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities.").
130 See Chemerensky, supra note 128, at 75.
131 j. ELY, supra note 118, at 8.
132 See Schlag, Framer's Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
283, 289 (1985).
133 See Saphire, supra note 1, at 518 (proponents of originalism argue that it is "instru-
mentally superior" to other theories of constitutional interpretation "because it is the
most successful in imposing constraints on the judicial decisionmaking process.").
134 Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections
and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226, 230 (1988) (emphasis in original).
135 See McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 89, 99 (1988).
136 See A. Cox, supra note 10, at 68 (when the Court comes to apply "such majestic
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originalists contend that an honest reading of the historical record
will yield a relatively determinate indication of what constitutional
language was intended to mean.
13 7
Although the shortcomings of originalism are well-docu-
mented,13 8 it remains a compelling theory of constitutional interpre-
tation because it seemingly is more consistent with traditional
American political values than nonoriginalist theories. Nonoriginal-
ist constitutional theory can take one of two forms. One such form
is nonoriginalist nontextualism, which posits that constitutional ad-
judiciation should produce the "best" results, as understood by the
person doing the adjudicating; text and original intent seem to mat-
ter little to proponents of this approach. One wonders, however, if
it is even necessary to bother with nonoriginalist nontextualism, in
that it seems rather incredible that any serious constitutional theo-
rist would advocate such an approach. 13 9 This is so because no-
noriginalist nontextualism is an interpretive theory which is
elitist, 140 unprincipled, and completely antithetical to the American
ideals" as 'freedom of speech,' 'due process of law,' and 'the equal protection of the
laws,' the words alone do not suffice in determining an outcome). See also, Brennan,
supra note 129, at 13 ("Like every text worth reading, [the Constitution] is not crystal-
line. The phrasing is broad and the limitations of its provisions are not clearly marked.
Its majestic generalities and ennobling pronouncements are both luminous and
obscure.").
137 See Kay, supra note 134, at 244 ("[fIt is almost always possible to examine the con-
stitutional text and other evidence of intent associated with it and make a reasonable,
good faith judgement about which result is more likely consistent with that intent.");
Meese, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, reprinted in LAw
AND LrrERATURE 27 (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988) ("[T]he meaning of the Con-
stitution can be known.").
138 A sample of the legal scholarship criticizing originalism includes Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Brest, The Misconceived Quest For the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Chemerinsky, supra note 117; Bennett,
Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984); Schlag, supra note 132; M.
TuSHNET, RED, WHrrE, AND BLUE (1988). Some scholars have criticized the political-
moral justifications for an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation; see generally,
Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justi-
fled?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985). This paper, however is less concerned with the
problems associated with justifying originalism than with the problems entailed by apply-
ing the theory.
139 See Moore, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 113
(1989) ("[N]o one seriously believes that noninterpretive review is legitimate."). See also,
Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV.
669, 687 (1991) (it is very difficult to locate any nonoriginalist nontextualists among
contemporary jurists and academic commentators).
140 See McConnell, supra note 135, at 105:
[T]here is no reason to believe that judges are likely to be more reliable than repre-
sentative bodies in discovering and enforcing natural right. Judges are grossly un-
representative of the population. All are lawyers, most are middle-aged or older, all
are upper-middle class or above, most are white males, most are secular and skepti-
cal in their philosophical orientation, in common with the professional elite in this
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conception of a constitutional democracy:
[R]ule by judges is objectionable in this society because it is inconsis-
tent with the principles of self-government. The tradition of this polit-
ical community cannot accept the proposition that the elite make
better decisions than the people, or that popular institutions are infer-
ior to electorally unaccountable ones. The cure to republican diseases
must themselves be republican.' 4 1
While nonoriginalist nontextualism may have occasionally oc-
cupied the crevices of constitutional law, rarely, if ever, has a judge
explicitly announced this to be his or her approach. The theory
stands in polar opposition to the American conception of govern-
ment and thus seems doomed to fail.
The second category of nonoriginalist theory, nonoriginalist
textualism, provides a more plausible approach to constitutional in-
terpretation. According to this theory, the words of the constitu-
tional text "should be interpreted as they are now understood, or as
they have been understood, by the American political commu-
nity." 14 2 This approach is an improvement over nonoriginalist
nontextualism because it provides a mode of decisionmaking at least
somewhat akin to principled constitutional adjudication. Judges are
constrained by the words of the Constitution; the text of the docu-
ment is authoritative, but not its original meaning. Rather, constitu-
tional provisions are interpreted to convey whatever contemporary
meaning they may reasonably bear.
Ultimately, nonoriginalist textualism is also a theory too flawed
to be seriously advocated. Its most cogent critics argue that the re-
sults of a nonoriginalist textualist approach to interpretation turn
"less on mind-on conscious human thought expressed through ac-
tual decisions-than on historical accident"; 143 constitutional out-
comes of such interpretation depend upon "the fortuity of the
authors' choice of words," a choice that may have been the result of
stylistic preference or mere happenstance.144 It certainly seems odd
to accord such linguistic randomness the status of fundamental law.
country. Rather than natural right, judges are more likely to impose upon us the
prejudices of their class.
141 McConnell, Book Review, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989). See also, Perry, supra note
139, at 687-88 ("Nonoriginalist [nontextualist] judicial review seems fundamentally anti-
thetical to basic axioms of modern American political-legal culture.").
142 McConnell, supra note 141, at 1524. See also Alexander, Of Two Minds About Law
and Minds, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2444, 2444 (1990) ("Present-oriented interpretation is an
interpretive approach to legal texts that assigns them the best meaning, in terms of con-
temporary social policy, that they could plausibly convey were they written today rather
than at the actual times of their enactment.").
143 Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 115 (1989).
144 Alexander, supra note 142, at 2449.
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Apart from causing constitutional law to depend on fortuitous
choices of language rather than thoughtful political deliberation,
nonoriginalist textualism makes little sense when one considers why
the Constitution is authoritative in the first place, that is, why we
perceive that document to be the supreme law of the land, rather
than the Ten Commandments, the Koran, or Grimms' Fairy Tales:
"We look to a constitution because it is already regarded as law and
that brings us back to the process by which it was created, to the will
of the constitutionmakers."' 145 The reason we regard the Constitu-
tion as fundamental law is inextricably linked with "something
about the way it was uttered"; 146 nonoriginalist textualism fails as a
theory of constitutional interpretation because it does not compre-
hend the reason why it is the Constitution we are interpreting.1 47
In summary, nonoriginalist nontextualism is a bankrupt consti-
tutional theory because it stands in polar opposition to American
conceptions of popular sovereignty and constitutional democracy.
Nonoriginalist textualism, while at least providing some constraints
on judicial discretion, likewise cannot be defended as a sound the-
ory of constitutional interpretation for two important reasons. First,
such an interpretive approach would often result in "governance by
linguistic accident" rather than by deliberative politics. 148 Secondly,
such an approach is seemingly at odds with the very determination
to treat the Constitution as law. 149 Therefore, originalism seems to
be a more satisfying constitutional theory because it potentially pro-
vides rules for principled judicial decision-making that are sensitive
145 Kay, Original Intentions, Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of the Constitution, 6
CONST. COMm. 39, 50 (1989). See also, Smith, supra note 143, at 111-12:
[Nonoriginalist textualism] effectively separates [the provision at issue] from the
source of its authority. To be sure, the words of the enacted law may continue to
constrain the judge. But the essential fact that made those words (and not a science
fiction novel, or even a law review article) efficacious to bind the judge-i.e., the fact
that the words express a specific collective decision made by the designated political
authority-is now de-emphasized or dismissed. The legal text is methodically disso-
ciated from the phenomenon upon which its power to constrain depends.
146 Kay, supra note 145, at 45.
147 See Smith, supra note 143, at 113 (arguing that, once untethered from their original
meaning, "the pertinent question" is no longer "whether the words can constrain, but
rather why in the world they should."). See also, McConnell, supra note 141, at 1528:
If one necessary (even if not sufficient) condition for the Constitution to be authori-
tative is that it was adopted by the people, then it follows that principles never
adopted by the people cannot be authoritative, even if they have some linguistic
plausibility. Functionally, to apply an unintended meaning is no different from in-
troducing a principle that has no textual basis whatsoever. The only difference be-
tween the unintended meaning and the extratextual principle is verbal
happenstance.... None of these principles were the product of the people's "re-
flection and choice." None of these principles properly can be said to be law.
148 McConnell, supra note 141, at 1526.
149 See Kay, supra note 145, at 45.
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to the reasons why the Constitution is our fundamental law. 15 0
Whether originalism in fact provides any more significant con-
straints on judicial discretion than do its theoretical competitors re-
mains to be seen.
C. WHAT IS THE ORIGINALIST METHOD?
Given the need for constitutional theory and the inherent short-
comings of nonoriginalist interpretive methodologies, it becomes
important to examine the contours of the originalist project. The
way in which originalists define their interpretive mission has been
largely influenced by the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v.
Board of Education.15 1 In Brown, the Court overruled Plessy v. Fergu-
son 152 and held that separate educational facilities based on race
were inherently unequal and thus violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The decision has generally
come to be seen as representing the work-product of the Supreme
Court at its finest.'
5 3
Because Brown is so firmly regarded as being a "correct" deci-
sion,1 54 any constitutional theory which hopes to be taken seriously
in America must provide an explanation that shows Brown to be con-
sistent with its premises. 155 This theoretical need to explain Brown
as having been correctly decided, however, poses a problem for the
originalist. Segregated educational facilities were in existence when
the fourteenth amendment was ratified and much historical evi-
dence suggests that the amendment was not intended to outlaw
such practices.' 5 6 The Brown decision seems to be difficult to square
150 See McConnell, supra note 141, at 1525:
The appeal of originalism is that the moral principles so applied [during judicial
review] will be the foundational principles of the American Republic-principles we
can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our nation's political character-
and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial
office.
151 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
152 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana's racial segregation of railroad
passengers).
153 See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1982).
154 See, Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAw & CoNT. PROB. 57, 70 (1978) (contending that Brown
is "as well justified a constitutional decision as any ever rendered by the Supreme
Court"); see also, A. Cox, supra note 10, at 259 (applauding the Court in Brown for not
ignoring "the emerging moral sense of civilization.").
155 See Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1990) ("No constitu-
tional theory that implies that Brown v. Board ofEducation... was decided incorrectly will
receive a fair hearing nowadays ... ").
156 In 1868 eight northern states permitted segregated schools and five additional
northern states excluded black children entirely from public education.... The




Originalists have reconciled Brown with their theory of constitu-
tional interpretation by differentiating between two possible ways of
defining original intent. One way is to limit the definition to the
specific, historically identifiable goals of the constitution-makers. 157
This approach attempts to ascertain the specific, subjective inten-
tions of the ratifiers of a particular constitutional provision through
historical facts, and then "reason from psychological generalizations
on these facts to conclusions about how the Framers would have
understood these textual phrases in present contexts."' 5 8
The original intentions of the constitution-makers can also be
defined in a less concrete, more abstract manner. This mode of
originalist interpretation "attempts to discern the principles the
Framers enacted, the values they sought to protect."'159 The distinc-
tion between an originalist project based on the specific intentions
of the constitution-makers and one based on more general constitu-
tional principles is made more clear when Brown is considered. As
noted above, it seems quite uncontroversial that those who enacted
the fourteenth amendment did not view segregated educational fa-
cilities as violating the immediate mandate of the equal protection
clause. 160 Originalism based upon the specific intent of those enac-
tors, therefore, necessarily would lead to the conclusion that Brown
was wrongly decided. Originalism based on the broader constitu-
tional principle signified by the equal protection clause, however,
need not arrive at the same conclusion. This is the case because the
clause is phrased in broad, nonexhaustive language; its textual man-
date speaks only in terms of equality:
MIhe [Brown] Court in 1954 understood, as the Plessy Court in 1896
did not, that racial segregation in public schools and other public facil-
ities in fact subjugates blacks, despite its appearance of symmetry, be-
cause it stands for and reinforces white supremacy-a regime we now
recognize to be utterly at odds with the concept of "equal protection
of the laws." It was not the concept embodied in the equal protection
clause that changed between 1896 and 1954, but only our relevant
main segregated... and even the spectators in the gallery listening to the Senators
debate the fourteenth amendment were segregated by race.
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TuSHNET, supra note 9, at 463 (citing R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 633-634, Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 460-462, and R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BYJUDICIARY 123-125 (1977)).
157 See Simon, supra note 138, at 1483 n.10.
158 Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. Ky. L.
REV. 479, 481 (1988).
159 Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, HUMANITIES, Feb. 86, at 22, 26.
160 See supra note 156; see also, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Deci-





When the intentions of the enactors of the equal protection clause
are stated in terms of the principles they sought to constitutionalize,
rather than the actual practices they meant to prohibit, Brown can
reasonably be explained as being consistent with the originalist
project.
Originalism based on constitutional principles rather than spe-
cific intent is also immune from the major criticism levelled at the
latter version of the theory. Critics of originalism often contend
that the theory requires projection of the constitution-makers' in-
tentions over time. 162 They argue that this entails a determination
of how the ratifiers would have decided the case today, if they had
survived to do so. Because originalists must ascertain how the ra-
tifiers would have dealt with issues they did not actually confront,
163
nor could have possibly foreseen, theorists critical of originalism
conclude that the theory is simply untenable. 164
Critics of originalism who attack the theory on these grounds
largely are taking on a "straw man." 16 5 As we have seen, the
originalism taken seriously today is not based on the premise that
the specific intentions of the framers are authoritative and binding
on future policymakers. Instead, the focus of the originalist inquiry
is the principles or values that the ratifiers meant to establish as
supreme law; it is those principles which are then applied in decid-
ing cases that involve situations which the framers could not possi-
bly have foreseen:
The originalist project is not to speculate about what the ratifiers' be-
liefs would have been in our day, were they still living, and then to
decide the case on the basis of those beliefs. Rather, the originalist
project is to discover what belief(s) the ratifiers constitutionalized, and
then to decide the case on the basis of that belief (in conjunction with
whatever beliefs are supplemental to it).
16 6
161 L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1477-78. See also, A. Cox, supra note 10, at 260 ("[T]he
Desegregation Gases of the 1950s faithfully projected the general intent of the sponsors
of the Equal Protection Clause upon a more particular set of circumstances as to which
the sponsors left no adequate record of their particular intent."); R. BORK, supra note I,
at 82 ("The ratifiers probably assumed that segregation was consistent with equality but
they were not addressing segregation. The text itself demonstrates that the equality
under law was the primary goal.").
162 See Bennett, supra note 138, at 457 (1984).
163 Id. at 465.
164 See Brest, supra note 138, at 221 ("[Originalism] involves the counterfactual and
imaginary act of projecting the adopters' concepts and attitudes into a future they prob-
ably could not have envisioned. When the [originalist] interpreter engages in this sort
of projection, she is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters' making.").
165 See M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAW 125 (1988).
166 Id. at 126.
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Originalism, therefore, is immunized from the objection that con-
temporary jurists cannot possibly discover how the enactors of the
Constitution would have resolved unforeseen modem situations.
167
The originalism which is advocated by its most insightful and
reflective proponents, one that focuses on the principles signified by
the constitutional text rather than the specific intentions of those
who ratified that text, therefore appears to be a more plausible the-
ory of constitutional interpretation than any other. Originalism is
superior to nonoriginalist theories because it requires judges to ap-
ply principles constitutionalized by the ratifiers of the document
rather than invent new ones. The originalist project therefore al-
lows for constitutional adjudiciation that is at least potentially con-
sistent with the political norms that America steadfastly adheres to,
namely democratic government and the supremacy within that gov-
ernment of the United States Constitution. This form of originalism
is also superior to its intra-theoretical competitor, one which is
based upon a very specific reading of original intent. An originalist
project which focuses on constitutional values and principles is able
to explain Brown as being correctly decided, and, because it does not
entail the futile attempt to discern how the ratifiers would have de-
cided cases they could not possibly have foreseen, also avoids the
objection that originalism is irrelevant and unworkable because of
societal and technological change.'
68
That a sophisticated originalist approach to constitutional inter-
pretation is less problematic than its nonoriginalist competitors
matters little, however, if there is no significant difference between
the two approaches to constitutional law (in the sense that original-
ism does not compel constitutional rulings that are different from
those compelled by nonoriginalism). 169 Increasingly, commentators
have came to question whether a distinction actually exists between
these theoretical approaches. 170 Professor Lawrence Solum con-
tends that the very sophistication that has made originalism a worka-
167 See Bork, supra note 159, at 22.
168 See Hoy, supra note 158, at 482 ("A major reason Bork formulates his position by
appealing to the Framers' principles and values is to avoid the objection that originalism
is irrelevent because society has changed so significantly.").
169 As Brown aptly demonstrates, a "constitutional principles" originalism definitely
compels judicial decisions different than those compelled by a "specific intent" original-
ism. Because this latter version of originalism requires psychological excursions into the
minds of those long dead, it truly is an unworkable constitutional theory. More interest-
ing are the differences (if any) between a sophisticated originalism and nonoriginalist
textualism.
170 See Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1599 (1989). See
also, Hoy, supra note 158, at 484 ("[I]t is hard to see whether there is a genuine differ-
ence between originalism and nonoriginalism in judicial practice.").
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ble theory of constitutional interpretation also has led to its
becoming increasingly indistinguishable from nonoriginalist theo-
ries. 171 Solum contends that both originalists and nonoriginalists
now are engaged in the same endeavor: uncovering the principles
that are signified by the Constitution.1 72
Because an originalist project based upon constitutional princi-
ples operates at a higher level of abstraction than does one which
focuses on a much narrower notion of original intent, its efficacy in
constraining constitutional adjudication legitimately can be called
into question. Untethered from the specific intentions of the ra-
tifiers, originalism appears to be potentially as malleable and inde-
terminate as nonoriginalism. Distinctions between the two theories
may therefore be largely illusory.'17 According to Professor Solum,
those who adopted the originalist approach in the hope that it
would provide a theoretical stronghold from which "activist" consti-
tutional decision-making could be criticized will be sorely disap-
pointed: "As originalism has been clarified in response to its critics,
it has gradually become more and more evident that it has no force
as a critique of the kind of constitutional interpretation practiced by
the Warren Court."'174
This characterization of originalism is surely one which its most
famous proponent, Robert Bork, would resist.175 Bork views
originalism as providing much more constraint on judicial discre-
tion than do Solum and those in agreement with him. In fact,
originalism represents such a constraint that, according to Bork,
never in its history has the Supreme Court been able to maintain
consistent allegiance to the theory. 176 Judge Bork views the
originalist position as a transcendental perch from which much of
the Court's work product over the last two hundred years can safely
171 See Solum, supra note 170, at 1601-03. See also, id. at 1603 ("There is no meaning-
ful distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist theories of constitutional
interpretation.").
172 See id. at 1613; see also, id., at 1629 ("In the end, I think both originalists and no-
noriginalists are after the same thing when they interpret the Constitution. They seek
the truths that the Constitution conveys to us.").
173 See Sherry, Book Review, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 1215, 1222 (1990) ("[O]riginalism leaves
as much room for interpretive discretion and manipulation as any other theory ofjudi-
cial review .... ); Saphire, supra note 1, at 520 ("[N]onoriginalists argue that originalism
is hopelessly unconstrained and unconstraining.").
174 Solum, supra note 170, at 1602.
175 Bork certainly sees originalism as providing the theoretical scaffolding from which
many decisions rendered by the Warren Court (and all other Courts, for that matter) can





What is the reason for these disparate viewpoints of the
determinancy (or lack thereof) of the originalist project? An answer
requires a return to what that project entails. Originalist constitu-
tional methodology is comprised of two "interpretive moments":
178
the first occurs when the principle signified by the constitutional
provision at issue is ascertained, the second occurs when that princi-
ple is applied to the facts at hand.' 79 Mr. Bork fails to see the inher-
ent indeterminancy of the sophisticated originalist approach
because, while acknowledging room for disagreement among
originalists when a constitutional principle is applied to a particular
set of facts, he refuses to admit to the broad range of plausible con-
stitutional readings that can be generated at the initial interpretive
moment.
Bork certainly understands that there is room for disagreement
among originalists as to the results of applying a constitutional prin-
ciple to a particular set of facts: "[T]wo judges equally devoted to
the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of
the principle at stake and so arrive at different results. , so180 How-
ever, he steadfastly refuses to acknowledge that room for legitimate
debate is also present when the authoritative principle is derived
from a textual provision.' 8 ' When Bork states that "[t]he principles
of the actual Constitution make the judge's major moral choices for
him,"' 8 2 he indicates a lack of sensitivity to the inconclusive nature
of much constitutional historical inquiry.'8 3 Constitutional provi-
177 Id.
178 Perry, supra note 5, at 236.
179 Id.
180 R. BORK, supra note 1, at 163.
181 Bork seems to suggest that any disagreement at this stage of the originalist inquiry
is due largely to disingenuousness: "[Elven a judge purporting to be an interpretivist
can manipulate the levels of generality at which he states the Framers' principles." R.
BORK, Foreward in G. McDowELL, THE CONSTrrTrrioN AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY xi (1985).
182 BORK, supra note 1, at 252; see also, id. at 4 ("The intended function of the federal
courts is to apply the law as it comes to them from the hands of others.").
183 For example, Bork contends that there "is almost no history that would indicate
what the ninth amendment was intended to accomplish," id. at 183. This assertion be-
lies the impressive scholarship which suggests that, on the contrary, there is a great deal
of contradictory historical evidence concerning that amendment's intended scope. For a
collection of essays that presents "a diverse cross-section of opinion" concerning the
ninth amendment, see THE RiGHTs RETAINED By THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEAN-
ING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed. 1989). See also Sherry, The Founders' Un-
written Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987). Compare Grey, The Uses ofAn Unwritten
Constitution, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 211, 213 (1988) (arguing that "the historical evidence
is equivocal" as to whether the ninth amendment was "originally meant to give constitu-
tional force to unenumerated rights") with Berger, The Ninth Amendment: The Beckoning
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sions often were the product of hard-nosed political compromise. It
should not be particularly surprising to find that historical evidence
is often available to support opposite conclusions when deciding a
constitutional case, nor that there is sometimes no evidence to sup-
port any conclusion.1
8 4
In addition to the often indeterminate nature of the historical
inquiry, another problem with Bork's high confidence in original-
ism's ability to discover the "correct" constitutional principle signi-
fied by a particular provision of the text has to do with the proper
level of generality at which these principles should be stated.185
This is an issue of the highest order for any interpreter of the Con-
stitution, for it is precisely the degree of generality that a principle is
stated at that dictates the outcome of applying that principle to any
specific case.' 8 6 For Bork, however, this does not constitute a prob-
lem; an originalist judge merely should "state the principle at the
level of generality that the text and historical evidence warrant." 187
This conclusory assertion, however, largely begs the jurisprudential
question with which originalist theorists must grapple: what is the
level of generality that is most consistent with the text and history of
a constitutional provision? Along with historical conflict over vary-
ing political positions among the ratifiers regarding the meaning of
a particular constitutional provision, there is also conflicting evi-
dence about the interpretive attitude which the ratifiers intended fu-
ture Justices to adopt. 8 8 When there is doubt concerning the level
of generality that a constitutional provision should be stated at, Mr.
Bork always chooses the narrowest plausible interpretation and crit-
Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 951 (1990) (arguing that the historical evidence reveals that the
ratifiers did not intend to constitutionalize unenumerated rights through the ninth
amendment). Bork also argues that the original meaning of the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment "is largely unknown." BORK, supra note 1, at 39.
But cf., Ackerman, Book Review, 99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1428-30 (1990) (chiding Bork for
failing to confront the fact that many of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment in-
tended to give constitutional status to Judge Washington's reading of the identically
worded privileges or immunities clause of article IV, which he enunciated in Corfield v.
Coryell, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823)).
184 Doubts as to the reliability of the historical record tend to exacerbate these diffi-
culties. See Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986).
185 See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 34-35.
186 See Perry, supra note 139, at 678-79.
187 R. BORK, supra note 1, at 149.
188 H. Jefferson Powell has produced the seminal scholarship discussing this point; see
generally, Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985);
Powell, Rules For Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987). See also Sherry, supra note 183, at
1127 (the constitution-makers "intended something independent of their own [specific]
intent to serve as a source of constitutional law."); D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 378-80 (1990).
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icizes others for not doing the same. 18 9 This, however, is not a
choice that is mandated by originalism: "The Constitution does not
say, 'Read me broadly,' or 'Read me narrowly."' 9 0 Bork must de-
fend his interpretive choice as being the one which is "most cor-
rect," rather than simply make conclusoryjudgements that are often
based on rather shabby historical research. 19 1
Despite the theoretical shortcomings of originalism, it still re-
mains the most satisfactory interpretive approach to reading the
Constitution. 19 2 However, valuable insight is gained through an un-
derstanding of the many times "originalism runs out," before yield-
ing a "right" answer to a constitutional question. 19 3 Part IV will
apply the originalist method to the cases that have established the
Massiah doctrine. This analysis reveals several plausible readings of
the sixth amendment right to counsel, none of which can be dis-
missed solely on originalist grounds.
IV. APPLYING THE ORIGINALIST METHOD TO THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
A. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
At English common law, persons accused of felony crimes had
no right to representation by counsel. 19 4 Oddly, those accused of
lesser misdemeanor charges were provided with the right to make a
legal defense through the assistance of counsel. 19 5 This anachronis-
tic state of affairs was apparently due to the Crown's understanding
that its interests were seriously threatened by criminal felony prose-
189 See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 187 (most prominent constitutional theorists "have
generalized th[e] [original] understanding so greatly, stated it at such a high level of
abstraction, that virtually no one who voted to ratify the document would recognize the
principles of the theorists as his own.").
190 Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 25. See
also, D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 188, at 383 ("Rather than look to history, Bork
looks to his own political theory" to resolve issues of constitutional interpretation).
191 See Sherry, supra note 173, at 1223 ("Bork's historical scholarship shows perhaps
his weakest and most manipulative side .. "); see also, id. at 1226 ("Indeed, most of
Bork's historical citations are stock excerpts from The Federalist Papers and Supreme
Court cases that appear in every constitutional law casebook. He appears to have read
very little else-neither the historical sources themselves nor the legal historians who
have studied them.").
192 See supra, notes 139-49, and accompanying text. See also, Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (although not without its own difficulties,
originalism is the preferred theory of constitutional interpretation because nonoriginal-
ism's defects are "fundamental and irreparable.").
193 See Perry, supra note 139, at 710-19.
194 W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 9 (1955).
195 See id. at 8.
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cutions.1 96 This rule was abandoned in 1836 when all persons ac-
cused in English courts were allowed to retain the aid of counsel.'
97
The English common law right to counsel was immediately seen as
being inconsistent with American conceptions of fairness.' 98
At least twelve of the thirteen American colonies rejected the
English common law rule and fully recognized the right to counsel
in all criminal prosecutions, except for one or two instances where
the right was limited to capital offenses or to more serious crimes. 199
In the period immediately preceding adoption of the Constitution,
the right to counsel was seen largely as providing the opportunity to
retain counsel only if a defendant was capable of doing so. 20 0 Four
states did provide for the appointment of counsel, but, in three of
those states, appointments were limited to capital cases. 20 1 At the
very least, the historical materials suggest an early awareness in
American courts that one accused of a crime was at a severe disad-
vantage without legal counsel.20 2
Against this historical backdrop, the sixth amendment was rati-
fied by the states, with nearly no debate, in 1791. 203 The silence
surrounding ratification of the sixth amendment is apparently attrib-
utable to a general understanding on the part of the ratifiers that the
federal courts would have jurisdiction of only an insignificant
number of criminal cases. 204
The fragmented historical record seems to be of limited aid for
one wishing to discover the principle embodied by the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, as originally understood. The English com-
mon law right to counsel was rejected early on. Most states
recognized the right to counsel but understood it only to mean that
a defendant could not be precluded from retaining an attorney.
196 See id. In cases involving misdemeanors, such as libel, perjury, battery, and con-
spiracy, "the state's interest was apparently deemed so slight that it could afford to be
considerate toward defendants." Id.
197 See id. at 12. See also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942); Note, An Historical
Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018-1028
(1964); Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
198 See W. BEANEY, supra note 194, at 1.
199 See Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65. See also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OFJUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINALJUSTICE' SERIES REPORT No. 3, The Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel Under the Massiah Line of Cases [hereinafter Report No. 3] reprinted in 22 U. MICH.
J. L. REV. 671, 673 (1989).
200 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 673 n. 11; see also W. BEANEY, supra note 194, at
21; Betts, 316 U.S. at 466-71.
201 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 673 n.l1.
202 W. BEANEY, supra, note 194, at 25.
203 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 673. See also, Note, supra note 197, at 1030-31;
Powell, 287 U.S. at 61-65.
204 See W. BEANEY, supra note 194, at 25.
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The scope of the right was also limited exclusively to the present-
ment of a defense at trial. It probably should be assumed that the
ratifiers of the sixth amendment intended to constitutionalize the
right to counsel as it was then understood by the states.20 5
Although the historical evidence suggests the ratifiers' specific
intentions concerning the right to counsel, the principle those spe-
cific intentions emanated from, i.e., the principle that is accorded
authoritative constitutional status, is much more difficult to discern.
Because federal jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions was ex-
pected to be of a very limited nature,20 6 the ratifiers seemingly spent
little time thinking through the implications of the constitutional
principle embodied in the right to counsel. 20 7 More so than per-
haps any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the contours and pa-
rameters of the sixth amendment right to counsel were left to be
shaped by the courts.
208
The right to counsel, therefore, offers the originalist with a dif-
ferent historical dilemma than that presented by some other consti-
tutional provisions. 20 9 Rather than yielding large amounts of
contradictory evidence, the historical inquiry into the right to coun-
sel provides little or no evidence of the significance that right was
accorded by its creators. 210 It initially is unclear what implications
205 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 673:
In the absence of illumination from [the debates surrounding the ratification of the
sixth amendment right to counsel], and given the actual words and context of the
sixth amendment right, it must be assumed that the right to counsel clause was
simply a restatement of the right already recognized by the individual states.
206 See Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal
Courts, 81J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 559 (1990) (prior to adoption of the Constitu-
tion, it was assumed that federal criminal jurisdiction "would be confined to a small class
of cases dealing with treason, revenue offenses, counterfeiting and crimes committed on
the high seas or against the law of nations.").
207 See W. BEANEY, supra note 194, at 25 (because of the understanding of the ratifers
that federal criminal jurisdiction would be quite limited, "the logical assumption is that
no great thought was given to the precise nature of the federal right to counsel.").
208 See id. ("Perhaps the strongest conclusion which can be derived from the English
development in its entirety and from early American practices is that the courts, and not
the legislatures, had within their hands the capacity and the power to shape the right to
counsel into whatever mold seemed best.").
209 See supra note 183.
210 Pierre Schlag sees this as a significant problem for an originalist; see, Schlag, supra
note 132, at 307:
[There are some situations in which there is no evidence of framers' intent. This
possibility haunts the reconstructive enterprise, for the [originalist] must have some
criteria to determine when the evidence of framers intent is indeed so doubtful, so
incomplete, or so indeterminate that reconstruction is not warranted and reference
must be made to some other source of constitutional interpretation. The framers
cannot supply any principle on this issue: it is one that we must construct and jus-
tify. What is required of the [originalist], therefore, is nothing short of a theory of
what can count as meaning and what cannot.
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this sketchy historical record has for the originalist interpreter. The
lack of attention paid to the right to counsel by its enactors could
itself convey a message about the original understanding,21' indicat-
ing that the principle invoked by the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel was intended to be read very narrowly. This is mere speculation,
however, because the ratifiers themselves spent precious little time
considering the issue.
Originalism does not offer a definitive answer to the questions
surrounding the principle constitutionalized by the ratifiers of the
sixth amendment right to counsel. This being the case, an original-
ist could conclude that the provision is judicially unenforceable:
"The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a provision is in
exactly the same circumstance as ajudge who has no Constitution to
work with. There being nothing to work with, the judge should re-
frain from working." 21 2 When this logic is applied to the right to
counsel, a constitutional guarantee deemed essential to the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in a civilized society, its ramifications seem
radical. It also seems odd to allow a silent historical record to trump
the fact that the ratifiers included the provision in the very docu-
ment that is being interpreted: "[I]t is difficult to imagine anything
more at odds with a framer's intention than that the constitutional
provision she has just helped to enact will be meaningless and
unenforced." 2
13
Certainly, an originalist such as Robert Bork would contend
that this is an unfair characterization of his interpretive methodol-
ogy, at least as it applies to the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Bork perhaps would argue that the provision itself is much more
clear and self-defining than more nebulous constitutional provisions
such as the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause
or the ninth amendment, thereby providing a judge with guidelines
for its application. As we have seen, however, the sixth amendment
is far from self-defining; in fact, the right to counsel poses especially
difficult problems of application because the scope of the right must
Another constitutional provision with a sparse historical record is the first amendment
freedom of speech clause; see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) ("The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech
and appear not to have been overly concerned with the subject."). See also, M. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13 n.27 (1984) ("[H]istorical reference has been of limited
value in first amendment analysis."); M. PERRY, supra note 153, at 63-66. Not surpris-
ingly, Bork resolves this dilemma of ambiguity in favor of a very narrow reading of the
scope of first amendment freedom of speech protection: "Constitutional protection
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political." Bork, supra, at 20.
211 See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 188, at 376.
212 R.BORK, supra note 1, at 166.
213 Nichol, Bork's Dilemma, 76 VA. L. REV. 337, 342 (1990).
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be determined in terms of when, to whom, and to what degree the
right attaches. As Massiah and its progeny aptly demonstrate, the
sixth amendment remains stubbornly silent with regard to how the
right to counsel is to be applied.
B. DEFENDING MASSIAH ON ORIGINALIST GROUNDS
Given that it is untenable to read the right to counsel out of the
Constitution, the originalist must find some plausible way to defend
a particular reading of the principle constitutionalized by the textual
provision. Perhaps we can say with reasonable certainty that the
right to counsel originally was meant to guarantee only that one
could not be barred from retaining counsel for the purpose of
presenting a defense at trial. This being the "specific intent" of the
ratifiers, how does one begin to extract from it the principle that
guided the practice, especially in light of the inadequacies of the
historical record?
One way of going about this task would be to examine the right
to counsel within the larger context of the sixth amendment itself.
Along with the right to counsel, the sixth amendment guarantees an
accused the right to a speedy and public trial by jury, the right to
notice of charges, and the right to both confront and compel wit-
nesses. 214 These protections, when considered in conjunction with
the fifth amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination, 21 5 offer
proof that the ratifiers intended to establish a constitutionally man-
dated system of criminal procedure that valued the rights of the ac-
cused and the integrity of the prosecutorial system over the
untrammelled pursuit of truth.2 16 They implemented this intention
by establishing an "accusatorial" system ofjustice. 21 7 There are as-
214 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
215 "No person shall .. . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Professor Grano notes that the constitutional
protection against compulsory self-incrimination, although sometimes protecting the in-
nocent, also "prevents courts from employing even humane inquisitorial procedures to
learn the truth from an accused." Grano, supra note 51, at 23 (citing Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 372 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), as a case that lists protection of the innocent as
but one value underlying the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
216 See Grano, supra note 51, at 23:
Certainly these rights and rules seem to reflect something more than a rationale
that this is the best way to determine truth. Viewed together, they evidence the
Framers' firm resolve to preserve the accusatorial tradition in judicial criminal pro-
ceedings. Although the reasons for this are not altogether clear, the Framers appar-
ently believed that individual liberty is best protected by a judicial system that
imposes limits on governmental authority, reduces the temptation to take eviden-
tiary shortcuts, and minimizes the appearance of unfairness.
217 See id. at 22 (citing Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in Ameri-
can Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1974)). Professor Goldstein defines
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pects of the prosecutorial system that have "inquisitorial" character-
istics:218 police interrogation, investigative grand juries, and
undercover surveillance are but three examples.21 9 Once the pro-
tections of the sixth amendment are triggered, however, the adverse
positions of the government and the defendant have "solidified," 220
and government must subsequently proceed according to the
amendment's accusatorial guarantees. 22' One of these guarantees
is the right to counsel.
Obviously, this argument is not compelled by the historic rec-
ord; the ratifiers never considered the issue. 222 In addition, catego-
ries such as "inquisitorial" and "accusatorial" themselves are
suspect and prone to manipulation. These shortcomings notwith-
standing, the argument represents a plausible originalist interpreta-
tion of the sixth amendment right to counsel. By its very terms, the
sixth amendment limits the government's prosecutorial power-it
establishes a standard of procedural integrity against which subse-
quent governmental action will be measured. Before the amend-
ment attaches, pre-judicial investigative procedures are subject to
the less stringent standards of due process and the privilege against
self-incrimination. But once the sixth amendment comes into play,
its protections, now in combination with those of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, offer an accused the full panoply of constitu-
tional protection: "Massiah operates on the premise that 'by its
the term "adversarial" as describing a system for determining facts within the context of
a contested trial. Id. The term "accusatorial" comprehends the adversarial universe,
but also includes other fundamental premises. Id. The right to pretrial release, the pre-
sumption of innocence, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are
attributes of our accusatorial system. Id. See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541
(1961): "[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system- a system in which the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured .. "; Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949):
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.... The requirement
of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the protection of the
accused from confessions extorted through whatever form of police pressures, the
right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to
be supplied by government when circumstances make it necessary, the duty to ad-
vise an accused of his constitutional rights-these are all characteristics of the accu-
satorial system and manifestations of its demands.
218 See Rogers, 365 U.S. at 541 (inquisitorial system is one in which the state, through
"coercion, prove[s] its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.").
219 See Grano, supra note 51, at 23 n.148.
220 See Kamisar, supra note 76, at 98.
221 See id.:
At this point, hopefully, the government has built its case. But if it has not, it cannot
expect to elicit any more information from the defendant. It is too late. From this
point on, the defendant is entitled to counsel and the agents of government may
proceed against him only through counsel.
222 See Grano, supra note 51, at 24.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
history, language and function, the [sixth amendment] sought to
draw a starting point after which counsel's assistance is generally
required as an element of an adversary system.' ",223 After sixth
amendment protections are triggered, extrajudicial investigatory
proceedings "must shed their inquisitorial attributes and take on the
procedural protections of the accusatorial system. The principle
protection, of course, is the right to counsel."22 4
Massiah is most problematic for originalists because, by holding
that the right to counsel precluded government attempts to obtain
evidence from a defendant, it extended the right far beyond tradi-
tional conceptions of the role of counsel at trial.2 2 5 If that extension
cannot be justified, "Massiah [and its progeny] simply have no con-
stitutional moorings.122 6 It is difficult to imagine the materials an
originalist would rely on to support a conclusion that Massiah illegit-
imately broadens the scope of the right to counsel beyond what was
originally intended. It is again important to remember that any con-
temporary reading of the sixth amendment requires some sort of
expansion on the original intent, at least any reading that recognizes
the constitutional necessity of appointment of counsel for those who
cannot afford it.227" The originalist project accomodates such expan-
sion, at least to some degree. With a record devoid of evidence con-
cerning the broad fundamental values the ratifiers meant to
establish through the right to counsel, the best an originalist seem-
ingly can do is to come up with a range of plausible interpretations
of the constitutional provision. At this stage, the materials have run
out; which interpretation of the right to counsel one adopts at this
point is a decision to which originalism is largely silent.
When read in conjunction with the guarantees of the sixth
amendment and the other provisions that establish constitutional
criminal pro6edures, the principle underlying the right to counsel
might be stated as such: the right to counsel shall extend to one who
is the subject of a criminal prosecution, to the extent necessary to
ensure a fair fact-finding process and trial.22 8 Although this may be
223 Kamisar, supra note 76, at 98, quoting Israel, supra note 9, at 1368 n.224.
224 Grano, supra note 51, at 24.
225 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 683; see 'also, supra notes 47-48, 85-89, and
accompanying text.
226 Grano, supra note 51, at 25.
227 Gideon is another case that seemingly has come to be seen as having been "cor-
rectly" decided, and has therefore'been defended on originalist grounds; see Grano, In-
troduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The
Contribution of the Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. Mxcn.J.L. REF. 395, 396
n.5 (1989) (arguing that Gideon is eminently defensible from a constitutional
perspective).
228 See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
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a hopelessly vague characterization of the right to counsel, it is diffi-
cult to conceive of any other characterization that would be more
"correct" in terms of originalism. Put another way, the right to
counsel ensures the integrity of a criminal prosecution by guaran-
teeing that the legal resources available to prosecution and defense
will be, to some degree, equal.
229
In applying this principle, the ratifiers specifically believed that
the fairness mandated by the sixth amendment was satisfied by the
assistance of counsel only at trial, "when the accused was con-
fronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor." 23 0 As cases such as Powell231 came to demon-
strate, the changing nature of the prosecutorial system rendered the
assistance of counsel "less than meaningful" when it was limited to
the formal trial itself.23 2 This realization was born out of an under-
standing that the right to counsel must be applied to a criminal
prosecutorial system that the ratifiers scarcely could have imagined:
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecu-
tor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled,
largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machin-
ery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution
at pretrial proceedings where the results might settle the accused's
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.
233
In recognition of the realities of modem criminal prosecutions, the
Supreme Court has broadened the scope of the right to counsel by
applying it to all stages subsequent to the commencement of formal
adversary proceedings. There certainly is nothing about this that is
inconsistent with originalism. On the contrary, it can be argued that
the Massiah doctrine is quintessentially originalist. The Court has
applied the constitutional principle signified by the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel (promotion of fundamentally fair criminal
proceedings) to a situation unforeseen by the constitution-makers
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 202 (1983) ("American constitutional crimi-
nal procedure values and protects fair process norms even when they impair procedure's
guilt-determination function.").
229 See id. at 201 ("The sixth amendment's right to counsel promotes procedural fair-
ness, regularity, and rationality by ensuring formal equality of access to the system.").
230 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1972).
231 See supra, notes 13-23, and accompanying text.
232 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 310:
Th[e] extension of the right to counsel to events before trial has resulted from
changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to gen-
erate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered part of the trial itself.
At these newly emerging and significant events, the accused was confronted, just as
at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both.
233 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
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(modem law-enforcement prosecutorial machinery) and have ar-
rived at a result that the enactors may not have agreed with at the
level of specific subjective intent (fundamental fairness mandates
that the government be precluded from deliberately eliciting infor-
mation from an accused, once adversary proceedings have formal-
ized). Although Massiah's reading of the right to counsel is not
absolutely compelled by the history and text of the Constitution, it
is certainly a "plausible" interpretation in terms of the values and
principles constitutionalized by the makers of the sixth amendment.
There is also a strong textual basis for Massiah's right to counsel
guarantees attaching immediately after the initiation of formal ad-
versary proceedings. Although the Court has not always been clear
as to when this occurs, 23 4 it nevertheless seems to be the proper
juncture of the proceedings to activate the right to counsel, given
the express language of the sixth amendment:
The requirement that there be a "prosecution" means that this consti-
tutional "right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that the
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [an ac-
cused].... ." "It is this point.., that marks the commencement of the
'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment are applicable.
235
At first glance, this point would seem rather uncontroversial.
By stating that the right to counsel attaches "in all criminal prosecu-
tions," the sixth amendment strongly suggests that the right should
be activated at the moment "the Government has committed itself
to prosecute. ' 236 Despite this seemingly logical adherence to con-
stitutional language, this aspect of Massiah also has been criticized
by those who contend it draws a line at an "arbitrarily fixed
point," 237 which is unsatisfactory because an accused's need for
234 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) ("[The right to counsel granted
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the
help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him---'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment.'" (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). See also, Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (applying the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing);
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (arraignment signals the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings). Of the Massiah cases, only Brewer involved the question
of whether formal proceedings had begun, see supra note 63.
235 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321-22 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688, 690) (plurality opinion).
236 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689:
The initiation ofjudicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then
that the Government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the ad-
verse positions of Government and defendant have solidified.
237 Kamisar, supra note 76, at 112.
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counsel is often as great before the commencement of formal pro-
ceedings as after.23 8 These critics argue that Massiah is "fundamen-
tally unsound" because unscrupulous police practices do not
somehow become more improper upon commencement of judicial
proceedings.
239
This criticism fundamentally misreads the constitutional logic
upon which Massiah is built. The Massiah doctrine has nothing to do
with the propriety, or lack thereof, of police tactics. Inquiries into
the character of the police behavior in question, while often appro-
priate when other constitutional provisions are at issue, 240 simply
are irrelevant for sixth amendment purposes. Massiah is based on
the premise that the sixth amendment was originally meant to draw a
firm distinction between the pre-judicial stage of investigation and
fact-finding and the accusatorial judicial stage itself.241 The right to
counsel applies to the latter, regardless of the character of police
conduct. Rather than throwing up a barrier to police questioning at
an arbitrarily fixed point, Massiah's insistence on the initiation of
formal judicial proceedings to activate sixth amendment protection
is, at least arguably, constitutionally mandated.
The Massiah doctrine recently has been criticized again as being
inconsistent with the originally intended scope of the right to coun-
sel. 242 This Comment has argued that this contention is untrue.
Although the ratifiers did not contemplate the need for the right to
counsel prior to trial, it is no longer controversial that the right ex-
tends to at least some stages of prosecution that precede the trial.
Commentators who generally agree that the Constitution guaran-
tees some degree of pretrial assistance of counsel, but who contend
that Massiah has gone too far, cannot demonstrate the point at which
the doctrine no longer is consistent with original intent. The ra-
tifiers may have specifically intended the sixth amendment right to
counsel to be a narrow protection. More importantly, for purposes
of the originalist, however, the enactors of the Bill of Rights also
constitutionalized a system of criminal procedure of which funda-
238 See id. at 112-13. See also, Saltzburg, supra note 78, at 207.
239 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 28, at 282.
240 When a suspect's confession is examined under the due process "voluntariness"
standard, that confession will be suppressed if the conduct of the police was "inherently
coercive." Id. at 266. Police misconduct is also relevant to determinations made under
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 283-319.
241 See Grano, supra note 51, at 28.
242 See Report No. 3, supra note 199, at 684-85. See also, id. at 665 (Massiah has no basis
in either the history or text of the Constitution, and therefore constitutes "merely a
cover for a judicially-imposed policy against the use of post-indictment confessions and
admissions.").
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mental fairness and the integrity of the fact-finding process were
central elements. These principles laid the groundwork for Massiah,
and, in that sense, the doctrine remains consistent with the original-
ist project. Because there is no definitive method of deriving the
principle embodied in the sixth amendment right to counsel,
originalism simply cannot rule out the Massiah doctrine as an im-
plausible reading of that provision.
MARTIN BAHL

